| SN | Reference | Project Title | Client | Customer Base | Industry | Date | Duration | Basis of Contract (Fixed Price or Man Hours) | Keywords and Standards | Nature of Support from PMSC | Content Safety | Content RAM | Content Human Factors | Content Systems Engineering and Integration | Project Summary | Key Deliverables | Man Hours - only applies to larger projects | Status as of January 2005 | PI Invoked | Disputes Arising as a result of PMSC work or performance | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0000 | 000 | Secondment to Rosyth Royal Dockyards | Mott MacDonald, Glasgow, Scotland | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1992 | 6 months | Reimbursable | Safety Case and Project Management | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working a amember of the Project Coordinator Auditor team PMSC provided personnel in the safety support function to the MoD at Rosyth. The team was evaluating the feasibility of locating the Trident Refit Facility at Rosyth Royal Dockyards. | Various inputs to PCA Reports | 1200 | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0001 | 001a | Safety Management Systems Review | Bechtel for Elf Aquitaine Norge, Norway | Norway | Oil and Gas | 1992 | 4 months | Reimbursable | Safety Case and Project Management and Safety Criticvality Activity Auditing on shore and Offshore | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | YES | PMSC provided support to Bechtel on their Safety audit of the Elf Aquitaine Norge operating company in Norway. The audits required a structured evaluation of Control, Adequacy and Completeness of safety critical activities performed or managed by Elf in the course of their business operations in Norway and in the North Sea. A series of about 60 structured interviews were held and the analysis of the companies Safety Management System undertaken. A management action plan was compiled to be able to implement corrective action. | -
SMS Audit Report - Reports from Key Interviews (eg OIM, Rig Room etc) - Analysis of key safety critical activities for Control Adequacy and Validation |
700 | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0001 | 001 | Common Cause Failure Methods Research | HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the HSE), Bootle Merseyside | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1992 | 4 months | Fixed price | CCF | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
on behalf of HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, PMSC Limited investigated
the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” Common Cause Failure system
defences. PMSC developed methods to allow a ranking of these defences, in
terms of their effect in reducing the likelihood of CCFs. The checklist consisted of specific questions which were raised on a system in a way in which the levels of CCF defence present could be readily identified and assessed. The ranking exercise was undertaken using a series of paired comparisons to judge the comparative weight of influence of each defence. Examples of the direct defences considered were redundancy, diversity, separation and segregation, whilst the indirect defences considered were defences such as reliability analysis. The culmination of this research was to produce a framework and checklist for the purposes of CCF auditing. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0002 | 002 | Peer Reviews (THORP) | HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the HSE), Bootle Merseyside | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1993 | 6 months | Fixed price | Peer Review, HAZAN, FTA | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly for the Health & Safety Executive Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,
PMSC Limited assisted with the peer review of the various THORP safety case
submissions. The reviews concentrated on the feed pond, the dissolvers and the various HAZANs performed in support of the safety case. In total, some 30 HAZANs were reviewed for a variety of fault scenarios. In each case, the fault tree analysis was independently verified using the Isograph fault tree construction and analysis TGR code. Examples of the types of scenarios reviewed were as follows: v Potential criticalities v Dropped objects v Impacts v Contamination problems v Aerial discharge Technical notes were prepared on behalf of HM NII to assist their decision-making process and allow them to consider the overall view on safety. |
Various Technical Peer Review Reports | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0003 | 003 | Common Cause Failure Study (Wylfa Power Station) | HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the HSE), Bootle Merseyside | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1992 | 3 months | Fixed price | CCF | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | PMSC
Limited acted as the co-ordinating consultants for the Health & Safety
Executive in a CCF in PSA comparisons study. PMSC’s remit was firstly to
help organise the competitive bidding process and produce the required technical
specifications for the work; and secondly to produce a summary report for
the project, comparing and contrasting the methods and results from the
study. The study comprised three consultants applying various CCF predictive methods to three pre-selected systems at the Wylfa Magnox Power Station in Anglesey. The CCF methods applied were as follows: v CCF cut-off method v Modified partial Beta Factor method v Partial Beta Factor method v Multiple Greek letter method The pre-selected systems were the Tertiary Feedwater System, Electrical Overlay System and the Reactor Ancillary Cooling Water System. At the time of the study, the EOLS was only in the design concept stage. The TFWS was present but not yet commissioned, whilst the RACWS was fully operational. Hence, a cross-section of arrangements was analysed. In order to facilitate the CCF analysis, the consultants selected for this study also constructed fault trees for each of the systems in order to compare the random contributions to those from CCFs. |
Research Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0004 | 004 | Safety Case Scoping Study for the Jubilee Line Extension | London Underground Limited, London | United Kingdom | Rail | 1993 | 3 months | Fixed price | Safety Case, Management, Safety Strategy | Consultancy | YES | YES | YES | YES | PM Safety Consultants Limited was responsible for scoping out the complete requirements for a railway Safety Case. The scoping study included both the technical requirements and the strategic options available to the management team to complete the safety case and maintain “ownership”, a key HSE requirement. In addition to the production of the safety case itself, PM Safety Consultants Limited personnel also gave advice on aspects of living PRA, and the concept of a rolling programme for the safety case. Presentations on these topics were given to senior management and at project director level, so that the London Underground Jubilee Line extension team could formulate their safety strategy. The advice PM Safety Consultants Limited gave was to build up an in-house team with a significant amount of work done within London Underground Limited. In addition, the use of consultants for some specialist areas was recommended. This advice was not fully acted upon. | Strategic Study Report on Technical and Commercial Managerial Issues | Fixed Price | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0005 | 005 | Heysham 2 Buffer Store Extension Cooling System | Nuclear Electric (Barnwood) | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1993 | 2 months | Fixed price | FTA, Reliability Modelling | Consultancy | YES | NO | YES | YES | Working
directly for Nuclear Electric, PMSC Limited was appointed as the independent
verification consultant for the reliability analysis of the cooling system
(performed by SRC), and the reliability analysis of the electrical supplies
to the essential service boards (performed by NNC). PMSC’s role was to co-ordinate and interface the two studies. To facilitate this work, PMSC recreated the fault tree analysis on its in-house fault tree package (TGR Ver. 4), and performed independent calculations to check the analysis. As a result of PMSC Limited’s co-ordination role, several recommendations were made to both NNC and SRC via Nuclear Electric to help interface the studies more smoothly, to achieve a consistent basis for the study. Post-Project Note It is understood that recommendations from this project resulted in projects 006 and 011 (both on Heysham) being awarded to PMSC Limited. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0006 | 006 | Reliability Analysis of the C & I for Heysham II CO2 Plant | Nuclear Electric (Barnwood) – Now British Energy | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 2 ½ months | Fixed price | C & I, Reliability Analysis | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly for Nuclear Electric, PMSC Limited performed a parts count reliability
analysis on the C&I design for the Heysham 2 CO2 Plant. This work involved
a review of the control and instrumentation diagrams for the following areas: v Auxiliary boiler control v Package boiler control v LP/HP transfer pumps v PSU/Vaporiser control valve The reliability predictions utilised Military Standard 217E Notice 1, and IEEE 500 as the baseline data sources. However, for some of the power pack units vendor service data was used. This work formed part of the design substantiation for the case for onload refuelling for Heysham 2. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0007 | 007 | Hazards Review / QRA Model & Database for the Jubilee Line Extension | London Underground Limited | United Kingdom | Rail | 1993 | 4 months | Fixed price | Hazards Identification, QRA, FTA, ETA, Database | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | YES | Working
directly for London Underground Limited, a major railway operator, PM Safety
Consultants Limited personnel assisted in the production of the detailed
technical specification for the Hazards Review package to support the eventual
production of the Safety Case for the proposed new railway line. The production
of the specification required a knowledge of the existing studies performed,
together with an understanding of the methodology to be employed. The intention
was to use the technical scope of work in a competitive tender. This project
was undertaken in one month. PM Safety Consultants Limited were also involved in setting up the initial Quantified Risk Assessment model for a major railway undertaking, and producing a database of fault data. The database was set up on Alpha IV using fault data for the existing and operational section of the railway, as well as other relevant fault models. The database provided the information necessary for the Fault Tree Analyses (FTA) using TGR software. Consequence analyses were performed by means of Event Tree Analyses using ETA software. A comparison was made between these findings and the results obtained from an earlier risk model for the existing line, and any weaknesses were highlighted. The new risk model and database formed the basis for the proposed hazards review, where both sections of line would become interfaced. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0008 | 008 | Railway Safety Case | Union Railways Limited, Croydon | United Kingdom | Rail | 1993 | 3 months | Reimbursable | Safety Case, Peer Review | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | YES | Working
directly for Union Railways Limited (a division of British Rail), PM Safety
Consultants Limited assisted in the development of the bid evaluation procedures
for the railway safety case and peer review contracts. In addition to the
preparation of the evaluation procedures, PMSC personnel provided an interim
peer review function pending the appointment of the peer review safety consultant.
Topics covered as part of the interim peer review were as follows: · Initiating fault schedules · Safety case content and format · Probabilistic criteria · Single versus dual track tunnels · Fault schedule hazard log · Corporate evacuation policy and strategy. Post Project Note Union Railways Limited became the client company for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, responsible for the day-to-day development of the project under the direction of Rail Link Engineering Limited. |
Study Report | 500 | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0009 | 009 | Secondment of Safety Personnel to AECL Canada | Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Deep River Ontario | Canada | Nuclear | 1994 | 18 months | Reimbursable | HAZOP, RCM | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly for AECL, PM Safety Consultants Limited provided ongoing technical
support to the Canadian Nuclear Research programme. Specifically, PMSC Limited personnel assisted on the HAZOPs and safety submissions for the MAPLEX project and various other reprocessing facilities at the Deep River site in Ontario, Canada. In addition, PMSC personnel also performed reliability and maintainability calculations as part of the reliability centred maintenance strategy being adopted and implemented by AECL. PMSC’s work was carried out under the management supervision of the Regulatory Services division, and was for submission to the Atomic Energy Control Board, the Canadian regulatory body. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the work, additional details are confidential and cannot be disclosed. |
Study Report | 2600 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0010 | 010 | EQE / PMSC Joint Bid to SNL | EQE, Warrington | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 2 weeks | Fixed Price | Bid Preparation | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Bid cancelled therefore project did not proceed. | Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0011 | 011 | Heysham II CO2 Cooling System | Nuclear Electric (Barnwood) – Now British Energy | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 5 months | Fixed price | FTA, Reliability Modelling | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | PM
Safety Consultants Limited was appointed by Nuclear Electric as the reliability
consultant for this project. The CO2 cooling system was undergoing design modification to support the
case for provision of cooling to the fuelling machine for onload refuelling
of the reactor. This system was required to meet specified design targets, and the reliability model developed for the project was instrumental in the decision-making process. The model was developed from the system schematics, and the failure rate data used was from PMSC’s in-house sources, supplemented by site-specific data wherever possible. The fault tree analysis was constructed and analysed utilising the Isograph TGR (Ver. 4) software. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0012 | 012 | Safety Case Handbook | Furness Engineering Limited (FETL) for Marathon Oil (UK), Aberdeen | United Kingdom | Oil & Gas | 1993 | 1 ½ months | Reimbursable | Safety Case, Risk Analysis, QRA | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working under sub-contract to FETL, PM Safety Consultants Limited took the lead technical role in Stage 1 of the preparation of the Safety Case handbook for Brae A, Brae B and East Brae. The Safety Case handbook was aimed at demonstrating work-force participation and understanding of the Safety Case to the HSE. Stage 1 of the process was the interview of key post holders to outline and scope out the detailed requirements for the Safety Case. One of the key issues was interpretation of the Quantified Risk Analysis (QRA) using data from risks in other industries and other types of voluntary activities such as smoking etc.. | Study Report | 200 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | PMSC had cause to issue solicitors letter to obtain payment from FETL who had unreasonably withheld final invoice payment - payment was subsequently made in full by FETL within 1 week of reciept of a High Court Writ from PMSC citing them as defendant and PMSC as Plaintiff. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0013 | 013 | Peer Review of Safety Cases | Conoco UK Limited, Aberdeen | United Kingdom | Oil & Gas | 1993 | 1 month | Reimbursable | Peer Review, Safety Case, QRA | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
under sub-contract to the FETL/ALTRA Joint Venture, PMSC Limited took a
lead role in the technical aspects of the peer review of the Section 5s
(Control of Major Hazards) for the following installation safety cases: · Murdoch and Caister (NNMI) · Lyell (sub-sea) fixed and combined operations · Murchison This work required firstly a broad review of the Section 5 content, and secondly a point by point review of content against HSE safety case regulations. The later stage was undertaken with the use of a proforma matrix, which PMSC personnel helped to develop. The results of this peer review, together with a description of the methods used, were proposed to be included within the Conoco Safety Case for submission to the HSE (OSD). Post Project Note The Conoco Safety Cases were accepted by the HSE OSD. |
Study Report | 150 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0014 | 014 | CCF Assessors Guidebook | HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (part of the HSE), Bootle Merseyside | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 3 months | Fixed price | CCF, Guidebook | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly for the HSE Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, PMSC Limited assisted
with the preparation of a CCF Assessors Guidebook. The work required the
review of ten selected CCF methods as indicated below: 1. Beta Factor Method 2. Partial Beta Factor Method 3. Enhanced Partial Beta Factor Method 4. Extended Partial Beta Factor Method 5. Rolls Royce Beta Factor Method 6. CCF Cut-Off Method 7. Multiple Greek Letter Method 8. Dependent Failure Probability DFP Method 9. C Factor Method 10. Binomial Failure Rate Model In each case, the guidebook presented a description of the method, and its data requirements. Furthermore, a critique of each method was presented in order to identify the pros and cons of each method. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0015 | 015A | Safety Analysis Report | Railtrack Major Projects Division | United Kingdom | Rail | 1994 | 9 months | Reimbursable | Safety Analysis, Management, Safety Strategy, Clearances | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working directly for Railtrack Major Projects Division South Zone, PM Safety Consultants Limited was responsible for co-ordinating the production of the Safety Analysis Report on clearances for the passage of both the new passenger-carrying rolling stock (Class 373/1 – Eurostar) and freight vehicles over the existing infrastructure between the Channel Tunnel and London. The study included the management of a civil engineering sub-contractor (CEDAC, Croydon) providing support to the analysis. PMSC personnel prepared scopes of work for the sub-contractor and then managed the programme of work throughout the project. The analysis was undertaken using the latest calculations for the derived Kinematic Envelope for the Class 373 train vehicles, and covered all major structures adjacent to the railway routes, i.e. tunnels, station platforms, under-bridges, over-bridges, footbridges and other miscellaneous structures such as viaducts and gas pipes. In total some 700 structures were reviewed, covering Channel Tunnel routes 1, 2, 3 and 4. | Study Report | 1350 | Completed | Requirement for PI waived by customer after PMSC offered Warrenty | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0016 | 015B | Hazards Operability Study for Ballast Gluing – Channel Tunnel Routes | Railtrack Major Projects Division | United Kingdom | Rail | 1994 | 3 weeks | Reimbursable | HAZOP | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working directly for Railtrack Major Projects Division South Zone, PM Safety Consultants Limited was responsible for organising a HAZOP study on the topic of ballast gluing for the provision of lateral restraint. Ballast gluing was used extensively on the South Zone Channel Tunnel routes, and as such a HAZOP was organised and implemented to identify any major hazards posed by the process. The role of PMSC personnel was initially to prepare the HAZOP brief and send it to the attendees for comment and review, and then to perform the role of HAZOP secretary at the meeting itself, and prepare the minutes of the meeting together with the detailed HAZOP action sheets. Finally, once all the HAZOP action sheets were closed out, a full report on the HAZOP was prepared for submission to the appropriate SAP in support of the overall safety case for clearances. | Study Report | 120 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0017 | 016 | Safety Analysis for SNL Dry Store Vaults & Storage Tubes | GEC Alstom Engineering Systems Limited, Whetstone, Leicestershire. | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 6 months | Reimbursable | Safety Analysis, Safety Case, ETA, Radiological Consequences | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly with GEC ESL, PMSC Limited personnel undertook detailed safety
analysis for the Scottish Nuclear Dry Store proposed for both Torness and
Hunterston. Specifically, PMSC personnel undertook detailed event tree construction
and analysis for Work Area 6, vaults and storage tubes. The event tree analysis required consideration of the following aspects: 1. Identification of bounding fuel damage sites. 2. Identification, description and quantification of event tree nodes. 3. Scoping out the requirements for the radiological consequence analysis. 4. Interpretation of the frequency and consequence results in terms of dose band information and expenditure of the dose band budget. The culmination of this work was the preparation of the detailed System Design Substantiation document for submission to HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Post-Project Note The Dry Store project was cancelled by the client (Scottish Nuclear) on 28th February 1995, in favour of reprocessing at THORP. |
Study Report | 900 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0018 | 017 | Preparation of Safety Case Documentation for SNL Dry Store | Thompsons Nuclear Engineering Limited, Wolverhampton | United Kingdom | Nuclear | 1994 | 2 months | Reimbursable | Safety Analysis, Safety Case | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly with TNE at Wolverhampton, PMSC Limited personnel prepared the
detailed System Design Substantiation documents which underpinned the production
of the safety case for the fuel drying machine and associated interlocks
for the SNL Dry Store. Post-Project Note The Dry Store project was cancelled by the client (Scottish Nuclear) on 28th February 1995, in favour of reprocessing at THORP. |
Study Report | 320 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0019 | 018A | Risk Analysis of LTF 25 Wheel Set | Blue Print Engineering Services for Powell Duffryn, Cardiff UK | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 6 months | Fixed price | HAZOP, Risk Analysis | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | PM
Safety Consultants Limited was responsible for providing advice on how to
conduct a risk analysis on the Low Track Force (LTF) 25 on behalf of Powell
Duffryn, the bogie wheel set designers. The owner of the wheel sets was
ARC operated via Mendip Rail, mounted on hopper vehicles used to carry aggregate.
The approach was to hold a HAZOP session using keywords and deviation agreed
prior to the HAZOP in the briefing note which was sent to all participants.
The HAZOP identified several guidewords which represented major component
items in the wheel set, including: · Wheel seat · Bearing seat · Axle · Bearing inner ring, cage and outer ring · Axlebox · Wheel set re-assembly · External factors · Management of the fleet At each stage the deviations were applied to the guidewords, the potential hazards discussed and any protection available to mitigate the hazard identified. Each scenario was then ranked via the risk matrix in terms of overall risk. The process was fully documented in a report which was submitted to the vehicle acceptance body The Engineering Link. |
Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0020 | 018B | QRA of LTF 25 Wheel Set | Blue Print Engineering Services for Powell Duffryn, Belper, Derbyshire. | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 3 months | Fixed price | QRA, HEART | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | PM Safety Consultants Limited was asked to provide a Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) for the LTF 25 wheel set. The vehicle acceptance body, The Engineering Link, mandated that the QRA would be required in order to facilitate consideration of allowing the LTF 25 wheel set back into service. The QRA was conducted based on the hazardous sequences identified by the earlier HAZOP. The QRA also included a human reliability assessment using the Human Error And Reduction Technique (HEART) applied to the wheel set inspection regime. The QRA was documented, and after comments was accepted by the Vehicle Acceptance Authority. The wheel sets were allowed back into service. | Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0021 | 019 | Risk Analysis Specification for the West of Shetland Field Development | Allott & Lomax for Allomax, Manchester | United Kingdom | Oil & Gas | 1995 | 1 week | Fixed price | Risk Analysis, ALARP | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working directly for Allott & Lomax on behalf of British Petroleum, PM Safety Consultants Limited personnel prepared a specification for a Risk Analysis framework for the West of Shetland field development. The specification focused on providing a framework within which engineering decisions could be made, to ensure that the risk posed by the sub-sea facilities was acceptable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). | Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0022 | 020 | Production of a Generic Quantified Risk Assessment Template | British Gas Exploration & Production, Reading UK | United Kingdom | Oil & Gas | 1995 | 4 months | Fixed price | QRA, EER | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
directly for British Gas E&P, PM Safety Consultants Limited personnel
prepared a generic risk analysis template using the Fault and Event Tree
construction and analysis tool “Fault Tree Plus”. The model developed was for a representative range of initiating fault conditions, and considered the level of fatality and injury under certain cascading conditions. The full details of the model are confidential, however, the model is capable of being fully automated to produce a cumulative frequency versus consequences curve as the end product. Since the model is fully automated, if the demographics of the platform are changed, the model can be edited electronically within a few hours to produce the new answer. Hence, the model provides the user with great power and flexibility in the production of sensitivity analysis. |
- QRA Report including Fault and Event Tree modelling | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0023 | 021 | Heathrow Express EMU Document Review | Interfleet Technology, Derby UK | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 2 months | Reimbursable | Independent Review, Railway Safety Analysis, RAMS Analysis | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | PM Safety Consultants Limited was requested to act in the role of an independent assessor and carry out a review of the Reliability, Safety and Maintainability Plan, and also a Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis documents prepared by Siemens, relating to the new trains for the Heathrow Express. This review was conducted on behalf of Interfleet Technology, Derby who were acting as the procurement agent for the British Airports Authority. | Study Report | 120 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0024 | 022 | Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis of Signalling - Jubilee Line Extension | Westinghouse Signals Limited, Chippenham | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 3 months | Reimbursable | FMECA, Signalling | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working
for Westinghouse Signals, PM Safety Consultants Limited were responsible
for the preparation of the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) for the Speed and Location Module, which was part of the moving
block signalling system to be installed on the London Underground Limited
Jubilee Line extension. This work required a detailed understanding of digital
electronics and the system operation. The FMECA was undertaken at pin level,
i.e. stuck HIGH and stuck LOW. Wherever possible, the built-in test equipment
BITE was identified as a means to reveal faults. The FMECA was conducted
over three months, and involved extensive consultations with the designers
of the module. Post Project Note In 1998 a decision was taken not to implement a moving block signalling system, and a fixed block system was installed instead. |
Study Report | 450 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0025 | 023 | Clearance Safety Work | Allot & Lomax, Manchester | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 6 Months | Fixed price | EPS, Clearance, Risk Assessment, Networker | Consultancy | YES | NO | NO | NO | Working as an advisor to Allot & Lomax, PM Safety Consultants worked on the safety aspects of the EPS / Networker Project on the ECML. | Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0026 | 024 | Clearance Safety Work | Railtrack | United Kingdom | Rail | 1995 | 1 month | Fixed price | EPS, Clearance, Risk Assessment, Networker | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | PMSC assisted with clearances on the Boat Train routes. | Study Report | Fixed Price | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0027 | 025 | Secondment of Safety Personnel to AECL Canada | Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Deep River Ontario | Canada | Nuclear | 1995/96 | 12 man months | Reimbursable | Nuclear Safety, HAZOP, Risk Assessment | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | PMSC
Limited placed a safety consultant on attachment with Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited to assist them with their safety and licensing assessment work load
associated with the various facilities at Deep River and Chalk River Nuclear
Laboratories in Canada. The nature of the work was to perform safety studies such as HAZOP’s, FTA and other risk assessment on the AECL plant. |
Various internal reports to AECL. | 1800 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0028 | 026 | Secondment of Safety Personnel to AECL Canada | Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Deep River Ontario | Canada | Nuclear | 1995/96 | 12 man months | Reimbursable | Nuclear Safety, HAZOP, Risk Assessment | Secondment | YES | NO | NO | NO | PMSC
Limited placed a safety consultant on attachment with Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited to assist them with their safety and licensing assessment work load
associated with the various facilities at Deep River and Chalk River Nuclear
Laboratories in Canada. The nature of the work was to perform safety studies such as HAZOP’s, FTA and other risk assessment on the AECL plant. |
Various internal reports to AECL. | 1800 | Completed | No PI Required by Customer | None | |||||||||||||||||||||
| 0029 | 027 | Various small safety and reliability projects for Interfleet Ltd | Interfleet Technology, Derby UK | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||